A video recording (excluding the audience Q&A) will be made available here.
Veteran politician Sanae Takaichi made history on October 21, 2025, becoming the first woman to assume the position of Japan’s prime minister. What are the implications of her election for Japan’s politics and foreign policy? What impact will the collapse of the 26-year-old Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)/Komeito partnership have, and how should we understand the LDP’s new partnership with Ishin (Japan Innovation Party)?
To answer these and other questions, on November 4th the Hamilton Lugar School’s 21st Century Japan Politics and Society Initiative (21JPSI) co-hosted a special joint virtual seminar with the University of Toronto’s (UT) Centre for the Study of Global Japan (CSGJ). The event featured six leading experts on Japanese politics and foreign policy from across North America. Co-sponsored with UT’s Asian Institute, Harvard University’s Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, and the Japanese Politics Online Seminar Series (JPOSS). It attracted close to 200 live viewers (and 330 confirmed registrants) from the United States, Canada, Japan, and around the world.
During his welcome remarks, 21JPSI Founding Director Adam P. Liff highlighted the profound impact Takaichi’s ascension to the top of her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Japan’s prime ministership has had in only a few short weeks. Most notably, early October witnessed the abrupt collapse of the 26-year-old Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)/Komeito partnership and the LDP’s formation of a new minority coalition with the Japan Innovation Party. The month closed with her formal ascension to the Kantei, a summit in Tokyo with Donald Trump, and trips to Malaysia and South Korea for various international gatherings, including bilateral summit meetings with other world leaders.
The first panelist, Daniel M. Smith (University of Pennsylvania), analyzed the significance of Prime Minister Takaichi’s election as Japan’s first female leader, situating it within global patterns of women’s political advancement. He emphasized both the progress and limits of gender representation in Japan—where women now make up only 16% of the lower house—and compared Takaichi’s rise to other conservative female leaders like British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Smith also discussed the “glass cliff” concept, pointing out that Takaichi assumed office during a challenging political moment for the LDP. However, he noted that even if she does not last long her tenure should be seen within the broader systemic instability of Japanese party leadership rather than as a gendered anomaly. After all, Smith noted, most other 21st century Japanese prime ministers—all men—have also lasted only a short time in office.
The second speaker, Amy Catalinac (New York University), examined the political and electoral implications of the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) recent breakup with its long-standing coalition partner, Komeito. She explained how this rupture has weakened many LDP incumbents who previously relied on Komeito’s mobilized vote base, while also freeing others who are more secure with their electoral bases and felt constrained by Komeito’s pacifist stance. Catalinac traced the coalition’s deterioration to corruption scandals, electoral pressures, and diverging strategic interests under Takaichi’s leadership. She predicted that while some LDP politicians may welcome the new partnership with the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai), the latter’s limited electoral infrastructure and focus on Osaka will complicate coordination and may eventually push some within the LDP to seek reconciliation with Komeito.
The third panelist, Christina L. Davis (Harvard University), discussed Prime Minister Takaichi’s handling of her first summit with U.S. President Donald Trump, emphasizing the mix of personal rapport, ideological affinity, and policy pragmatism that helped make the meeting a success. She noted Takaichi’s effectiveness so far in managing an increasingly challenging bilateral relationship, citing her commitment to increasing defense spending and strengthening Japan’s security cooperation with the U.S.—issues of great interest to a series of U.S. presidents, not only Trump. Davis also analyzed the trade and investment aspects of the new U.S.–Japan agreement, arguing that Japan’s $550 billion investment pledge, despite some unusual and as-yet-not-fully-clarified features, represented basic continuity in mutual interests—particularly in critical industries and energy projects—rather than an abrupt shift in economic strategy.
The fourth panelist, Saori N. Katada (University of Southern California), focused on Japan’s evolving economic security strategy under Takaichi’s leadership. She highlighted the Prime Minister’s vision of combining “strategic indispensability” with “strategic autonomy” through proactive industrial and technological policy. Katada noted that Takaichi’s government is likely to pursue aggressive investment in semiconductors, quantum science, and other advanced sectors, while also building new institutions such as a Japanese version of the U.S. Committee on Foreign Investment (CFIUS). Her remarks underscored the Takaichi administration’s likely continued blending of economic and national security aims in a manner that positions Japan for a more assertive industrial role in global technology competition.
The fifth speaker, Phillip Y. Lipscy (University of Toronto) — Professor Lipscy examined the Takaichi administration’s likely approach to energy security and climate policy. He contrasted Japan’s earlier leadership in energy efficiency with its more recent lagging performance and noted potential indicators of a return under Takaichi to policies resembling the Abe era’s “Abe Energynomics.” Lipscy argued that Takaichi’s skepticism toward solar power and preference for nuclear and fossil fuels reflect economic security concerns about dependence on Chinese supply chains. He predicted continued cooperation with the U.S. and Canada on LNG, a possible reduction in renewable energy subsidies, and a focus on energy technologies that reinforce Japan’s industrial advantages, suggesting Japan will remain a pragmatic, not revolutionary, actor in climate policy.
The last speaker, Adam P. Liff (Indiana University), closed the panel by summarizing his expectations for Japan’s defense policy trajectory under the Takaichi government. He suggested that Takaichi’s approach will most likely be characterized not by a radical departure from the trajectory pursued by her predecessors but rather a continued acceleration of forward movement along the “three tracks” at the heart of Japan’s national security strategy dating back at least to 2013: strengthening deterrence through enhanced defense capabilities; bolstering U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation; and expanding Japan’s defense cooperation with other U.S. allies and partners. As evidence, Liff noted her early pledges to significantly move up the planned target of 2% of GDP in defense-related spending and the timeline for revising the December 2022 “three documents” (national security strategy, national defense strategy, and defense buildup program). In assessing factors likely to shape what comes next Liff highlighted how the collapse of the LDP-Komeito coalition and the latter party’s replacement by fellow conservative “Ishin no Kai” (Japan Restoration Party) may affect the pace, scale, and significant of defense reforms. However, echoing comments from Catalinac, he also noted that the LDP-Ishin coalition’s durability is not yet proven. He closed by warning against a widespread tendency to overlook the complex interplay between domestic political dynamics and national security decision-making in Japan.
After each speaker offered their prepared remarks, Prof. Lipscy of the University of Toronto moderated a discussion and audience Q&A featuring questions from scholars, students, journalists, and others from around the world.
The discussion made clear that Prime Minister Takaichi has already left quite a mark on Japanese politics and foreign relations and that we should expect that to continue. Although it is still early days and much remains uncertain about what the future holds—including whether her prime ministership will be as short-lived as that of her immediate predecessor—it is abundantly clear that there are numerous changes underway in Japan that bear watching in the months and years to come.
*The 21st Century Japan Politics and Society Initiative (21JPSI) was launched at Indiana University’s Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies in 2018. Under the leadership of Founding Director and Hamilton Lugar School faculty member Adam Liff and thanks to significant financial support from the Japan Foundation, from its base in the Midwest 21JPSI aims to invigorate and expand research, teaching, and programming on contemporary Japanese politics, society, and international (esp. U.S.-Japan) relations, and to educate, raise awareness, and debate policy responses to the various political, social, and foreign policy challenges that Japan faces today.
For more information about 21JPSI and upcoming events, please visit https://jpsi.indiana.edu/ and sign up for our event announcement mailing list.
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